The Fine Art of Cherry Picking, or Gas in Iraq

One of the more notorious Churchill quotes is usually presented as follows:

I am strongly in favour of using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes…[It] would spread a lively terror.

This statement appears in Johann Hari’s review of Richard Toye’s book Churchill’s Empire. Hari characterises this as an instance of Churchill demanding that colonial subjects, when they “defied his script…be crushed with extreme force” and that, partly for his view on using gas on “uncivilised tribes”, Churchill was “seen as at the most brutal and brutish end of the British imperialist spectrum”. Shashi Tharoor, in his essay in the Washington Post, includes the aforementioned quote and describes this as the act of a “war criminal”. The BBC placed Churchill’s opinion of poison gas as the second-most controversial aspect of Churchill’s life and legacy. 

In fact, this quotation is a fine example of the fallacy of incomplete evidence, otherwise known as cherry picking. The statement derives from a minute that Churchill wrote in May 1919 (not 1921, despite what Tharoor writes). It reads as follows:

I do not understand this squeamishness about the use of gas. We have definitely adopted the position at the Peace Conference of arguing in favour of gas retention as a permanent method of warfare. It is sheer affectation to lacerate a man with the poisonous fragment of a bursting shell and to boggle at making his eyes water by means of lachrymatory gas.

I am strongly in favour of using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes. The moral effect should be so good that the loss of life should be reduced to a minimum. It is not necessary to use only the most deadly gasses: gasses can be used which cause great inconvenience and would spread a lively terror and yet would leave no serious permanent effects on those affected (Quoted in Douglas, “Chemical Weapons”, p.861; emphasis added).

Churchill was clearly advocating the use of tear gas (“lachrymatory gas”) and pointing out the absurdity (to him) of causing horrific injuries with conventional weapons yet refusing to employ less harmful chemical weapons. Dr Warren Dockter, of the University of Aberystwyth, summarises Churchill’s position thus:

These memoranda clearly demonstrate that Churchill saw the employment of gas as a tool for controlling ‘native tribes’ and for creating a crisis of morale among the ranks of the dissidents, a concept Trenchard wholeheartedly endorsed. Poison gas was never meant to exterminate frontier tribesmen but it did set a precedent in Churchill’s thinking on colonial air-policing as he would repeatedly return to the use of gas as a relatively humane and inexpensive way to maintain order (Dockter, Islamic World, p.113).

David A.T. Stafford, formerly of the Centre for the Study of the Two World Wars at the University of Edinburgh, describes the interpretation that critics like Hari and Tharoor place on the quote as “far from accurate”. He attributes the continued misrepresentation of the minute to “Churchill’s own confused use of the term ‘poison gas’ when he was referring to non-lethal tear gas and not the far more deadly chlorine or phosgene gas” (Stafford, Oblivion or Glory, p.187).  Here I have to disagree with Stafford. I think many of Churchill’s determined critics – and I include Tharoor in this category without question - are set to despise him come what may. They just don’t seem to care about what Churchill actually said and did.

Churchill’s support for non-lethal gas as a tool of counter-insurgency is impossible to miss if you’ve carefully read what Churchill wrote. Many people online have no intention of doing that and are content to spread misinformation. Of course, the internet is a large space and full of (to quote Chris Snowdon) “bad faith actors, obsessives, bores, pile on merchants, psychopaths and borderline retards”. It isn’t surprising, therefore, to see the misquote still widely used by Churchill's detractors. It is much more concerning that even (semi-)respectable outlets publish dross containing the misquote.

Before moving on, I wish to highlight another example of selective quotation. In his article, Tharoor writes:

 “He [Churchill] wanted to use chemical weapons in India but was shot down by his cabinet colleagues, whom he criticized for their “squeamishness”, declaring that the “objections of the India Office to the use of gas against natives are unreasonable”.

Tharoor however leaves out what exactly Churchill thought was unreasonable. In a minute dated May 29^th 1919 Churchill wrote:

If it is fair war for an Afghan to shoot down a British soldier behind a rock and cut him in pieces as he lies wounded on the ground, why is it not fair for a British artilleryman to fire a shell which makes said native sneeze? It is really too silly” (quoted in Douglas, “Chemical Weapons”, p.868-869, fn.39; emphasis added).

Again, Churchill was pointing out the apparent absurdity of using high explosives and machine guns on enemy troops (which the India Office had no qualms about using) while balking at the prospect of using non-lethal chemicals against those same enemy troops.

What Actually Happened in Iraq?

Critics often connect Churchill’s minute of May 1919 to the insurgency in Iraq the following year. Therefore, it is worthwhile discussing what actually happened during that conflict. The rebellion broke out in June 1920. In August, the C-in-C of the British forces in the country – Lt. Gen. Sir James Aylmer Haldane - messaged London requesting that both the Army and the Royal Air Force be given permission to use chemicals weapons – “gas bombs” – against the insurgents. The commander of the local Royal Air Force contingent agreed with Haldane. In London, Haldane’s request was supported by none other than the head of the British Army, Sir Henry Wilson (Douglas, “Chemical Weapons”, pp.872-873).

Churchill considered the matter and agreed in principle. He was, however, bound by a Cabinet decision the prior October that Britain would not initiate chemical warfare but only retaliate in kind. Believing he had found a loophole, Churchill authorised the use of chemical weapons provided they were either in Iraq or in the process of being transported to Iraq. Churchill informed Wilson that:

If gas shell for the artillery is available on the spot or in transit it sh[oul]d certainly be employed in the emergency prevailing. It is not considered that any question of principle is raised by such an emergency use of the limited ammunition of various kinds. As no question of principle is involved there is no need for any special declaration. G.O.C.-in-C. should defend his positions with whatever ammunition is at hand (Quoted in Douglas, “Chemical Weapons”, p.873).

It turned out that there were no gas weapons in Iraq. In September, Haldane had to request the importation of chemical weapons from the nearest source – Egypt. He asked for 5,000 rounds of 60-pounder SK shells and 10,000 rounds of 4.5-inch howitzer shells. Churchill authorised the dispatch (Douglas, “Chemical Weapons”, p.874). Transport difficulties meant that the weapons did not arrive until after the rebellion had been defeated (Douglas, “Chemical Weapons”, pp.882-883).

At the same time, Churchill authorised the Royal Air Force to begin experimental work on producing aerial gas bombs, saying that he wanted them to produce a weapon that would “inflict punishment upon recalcitrant natives without inflicting grave injury upon them” (quoted in Gilbert, “Churchill”, pp.424-425).

The weapons Churchill sent to Iraq were tear gas shells. According to R.M. Douglas, the Russell B. Colgate Distinguished University Professor of History at Colgate University:

The use of gas shells in Iraq albeit containing tear gas rather than poison gas, was indeed sanctioned by the War Office [i.e., Churchill’s ministry] during the emergency of 1920. The decision to do so was taken by Churchill alone, who neither consulted nor even informed his ministerial colleagues – no doubt in view of the certainty that they would have strongly opposed it (Douglas, “Chemical Weapons”, p.874; emphasis added).

Douglas goes on to quote Sir John Salmond, the head of the Royal Air Force in Iraq, as describing SK gas as “Lacrimatory” [sic] and J.A. Webster, assistant secretary at the Air Ministry, as describing the chemical weapon sent to Iraq in 1920 as “definitely classified as non-lethal” (Douglas, “Chemical Weapons”, p. 876). The British Army conducted human trials in Iraq (using their own soldiers as the test subjects) using the 4.5-inch SK artillery shell to determine its effects. It found that the gas irritated the eyes of men even if they were wearing respirators, but within twenty minutes the effects wore off and the subjects could “remove their masks completely and walk about without discomfort” (Douglas, “Chemical Weapons”, p.878).

The Royal Air Force asked permission from Churchill for permission to convert the artillery shells to aerial gas bombs. Tellingly, the case they put across to Churchill stressed the non-lethal effects of aerial gas weapons and made them seem benign. In this respect, they were an improvement even on the artillery shells. Notwithstanding the human trials conducted by the Army, and while conceding that the 4.5-inch shells were “non-lethal” weapons and “far less noxious than even mustard gas”, Webster argued that they potentially could have “serious” and “permanent effects” on eyes and in “some certain circumstances, cause death”. However, “the dropping of these shells from aircraft is definitely less likely to produce fatal results than their discharge from guns, since it would be exceedingly difficult to obtain a concentration sufficient to cause anything more than extreme discomfort” (quoted in Douglas, “Chemical Weapons”, p.876 & 862). If Churchill had been so indifferent to the lives of native tribesmen as often alleged, why did the Royal Air Force feel the need to sell the prospect of aerial chemical weaponry to him by stressing how humane it was?

Churchill declined to make a decision until advised by the British plenipotentiary in Iraq, Sir Percy Cox. Sir Percy talked the issue through with Iraq’s monarch, Faisal I. Faisal had “no objection to the use of gas bombs in Iraq provided that they were not lethal or permanently injurious to health”. Sir Percy recommended the usage of the aerial gas bombs (Douglas, “Chemical Weapons”, p.879).

Having been informed that the SK gas was non-lethal, that aerial bombs were even less dangerous than artillery chemical weapons, and that the Iraq government has no problem with the use of chemical weapons, Churchill authorised the Royal Air Force’s use of those weapons in December 1921. Formal permission was conveyed in January 1922. However, the Royal Air Force could only use it in the defence of “isolated post[s] whose communications are cut and whose existence is threatened”. In any other scenario, the Royal Air Force would need to request permission from the Colonial Secretary before using aerial gas bombs (Douglas, “Chemical Weapons”, p.879).

Two days before Salmond got permission to convert the gas shells to aerial bombs, the Washington Disarmament Conference passed a resolution forbidding the use of chemical weapons of any kind in war, even tear gas. Churchill therefore quickly rescinded his authorisation to the RAF (Douglas, “Chemical Weapons”, pp.879-880).

Churchill in Context

When discussing Churchill, many of his defenders feel the need to suggest he was “a man of his time” or “everyone/ lots of people had similar feelings back in Churchill’s day”. This is often unnecessary as the criticisms are frequently made up out of whole cloth and Churchill’s views seem reasonable by today’s standard, let alone the standard of one hundred years ago.

In this case, though, it is worth discussing the milieu when Churchill made his remarks about chemical warfare for two reasons. Firstly, because many of his detractors claim this as an example of Churchill’s extremism and brutishness that astonished even his contemporaries (e.g., Hari’s remarks quoted above). The second is because the taboo against using any kind of chemical agent is so strong today that it is easy to assume that it was ever thus.

 In regard to this taboo, historian Marion Girard wrote:

The taboo did not develop immediately after World War I in Britain, let alone in the world. Nor was it instinctive; there were many rational arguments for keeping gas in the repertoire of weapons, as Haldane, Churchill, and others demonstrated during the interwar period. The British taboo was not inevitable. If Britain had continued to accept gas rather than reject it, so might the rest of the world. After all, in the decades between the World Wars, Britain was still one of the most influential global leaders. If she had refused to abandon gas, perhaps others would not have embraced arguments against gas and emphasized its negative characteristics. Yet, because they did so strongly, only the destructive story of gas has been remembered and told; the part of its history in which gas has been accepted and even embraced has been forgotten, and thus the taboo seems inescapable (Marion Girard, Strange and Formidable, p.198).

The important thing to remember is that Churchill - and others – had just witnessed one of the most devastating wars in European history. They had seen men’s skin shredded on barbed wire, bones and nerves destroyed by artillery fire, horrendous burns caused by flamethrowers, and bodies riddled by machine gunfire. To many people, gas, especially tear gases, didn’t seem so bad in comparison to conventional weaponry. This was not an opinion unique to Churchill. The General Staff made the same point in March 1919:

If it is advisable and possible to abolish gas on purely humanitarian grounds, the abolition of High Explosive, a far more terrible weapon which removes limbs, shatters bones, produces ‘nerves’, and generates madness, is equally advisable(quoted in Douglas, “Chemical Weapons”, p.867).

At various times, the use of tear gas weapons in Iraq was endorsed by:

• Field Marshall Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff
• Lt-Gen Sir James Aylmer Haldane, Commander-in-Chief of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force
• Sir John Salmond, then Air Officer Commanding British Forces in Iraq and later Marshall of the Royal Air Force
• Sir Percy Cox, High Commissioner of Iraq
• Faisal I, the King of Iraq

There were other senior colonial officials from elsewhere in the Empire who asked, well into the 1920s, for the Cabinet’s prohibition on the use of non-lethal gas to be set aside. Douglas mentions officials in India, Southern Rhodesia, Nigeria and Egypt asking for this. The Chiefs of Staff, the General Staff and members of the Committee for Imperial Defence also made the same point (Douglas, “Chemical Weapons”, p.881). Authorities in France, South Africa and the United States of America used tear gas “hundreds” of times in the inter-war period (Douglas, “Chemical Weapons”, p.881).

It wasn’t just colonial officials who were in favour of non-lethal gas weapons either. In some respects, gas seemed less cruel than conventional weapons. One of the most brilliant scientists of the 20^th century, J.B.S. Haldane, felt very strongly that this was the case and argued in a book titled “Callinicus: A Defence of Chemical Warfare” in 1925 that chemical weapons did not result in a large proportion of combat fatalities (Coleman, History of Chemical Warfare, p.33). “In his opinion, gas did not deserve its status as a pariah among armaments (Girard, Strange and Formidable, p.164). Another scientist, Victor Lefebure, also “believed that gas was a relatively humane weapon, if a humane weapon was one that produced a lower “death rate… [and] a much smaller proportion of the injured suffered any permanent disability”” (Girard, Strange and Formidable, p.179; emphasis in the original).

Conclusion

Many of Churchill’s detractors paint his support for chemical weapons as evidence of a wicked or depraved mind. At the very least, he is alleged to have shown a shocking indifference to the people who would be affected by the weapons. This is ahistorical. Churchill supported the use of tear gas as a tool of counterinsurgency. He never pushed for chlorine gas or phosgene gas to be used in Iraq. In the case of Iraq specifically, he authorized the use of tear-gas weapons. Later on, he approved the development of an aerial tear gas weapon which, the Royal Air Force claimed, was even less harmful. Churchill wanted weapons to be used that would not inflict “grave injury” nor leave “serious permanent effects” on the natives. Churchill’s support for the use of tear gas weapons was supported by numerous senior officials and the Iraqi Government itself, although not the Cabinet as a whole. In the event, tear gas was not used in Iraq and Churchill rescinded his permission to use such weapons. 

Bibliography

Coleman, Kim, A History of Chemical Warfare (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)

Dockter, Warren, Churchill and the Islamic World: Orientalism, Empire and Diplomacy in the Middle East (I.B. Tauris, 2015)

Douglas, R.M., "Did Britain Use Chemical Weapons in Mandatory Iraq", The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 81, No. 4 (December 2009), pp.859-887

Gilbert, Martin, Churchill: A Life (Pimlico, 2000)

Girard, Marion, A Strange and Formidable Weapon: British Responses to World War I Poison Gas (University of Nebraska Press, 2008)

Stafford, David, Oblivion or Glory: 1921 and the Making of Winston Churchill (Yale University Press, 2019)